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Re-Evaluation of Self: An Exan1ination
of the Political and Personal Outlooks of
White A1nerica and Japanese-Americans
on the Post-World War II Era
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Melissa Johnson
The United Slates Government awarded Lhe 442 nd
Battalion with 9,486 Purple Hearts, 4,000 Bronze
Stars, and 560 Silver Stars due to their heroism in the
European Theater during World War 11. 1 Despite the
loyalty and bravery these soldiers demonstrated during
the war, adversity and suspicion greeted them back
home. The American population's reaction forced
them into a silence that in many ways led lo their
invisibility over the years. Why did this happen? The
simple answer is racial prejudice since the unit's
members were second-generation (Nisei) Japauese
American soldiers. In light of Lhe war in the Pacific,
prejudice does not seem like a stretch of the imagination. However, Anti-J apanese feelings did not begin
with the war, but rather in 1851, when the first
Japanese arrived along with West Coast. 2 To the
Japanese population, Anti-Asian sentiment meant that
their post-war integration was not a simple re-acceptance or re-entry into American society; instead
integration created a need for all Japanese lo reevaluate their ethnic and cultural identities. Ethnic
1
Edwin Nakasone, The Nisei So ldier, (While Bear Lake, MN :
J -Press, 1999), 4 4-45.
2
Raymond Buell, "The Develop111 e nt of the Anti-Japanese
/\gilalion in the United Stales," PoliLicul Science Quarlerly , 37
(Dec., 1922), 605 .
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re-evaluation signified the complete submergence of
Japanese culture and a complete acceptance of an
American ideology.
Unhealthy Japanese-American and white-American
relations at the end of World War 11 coerced the Japanese to re-evaluate their ethnic identity. JapaneseAmericans realized that their physical appearance
reminded the United States of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific .
The
Japanese-Americans opted, therefore, to culturally and
socially blend into middle-class, white America. In
effect, the Japanese asked America to accept them
under the condition that they would not perpetuate a
Japanese-ness. America asked the Japanese not to
remind them of their ethnic Japanese and cultural
identity, and offered national acceptance in return.
The story of the 442 nd presented an archetype for
Japanese integration. The Japanese population's lack
of acceptance during the war led many Nisei to voluntarily sign up for the 442 nd in order to prove Japanese
loyalty to the United States. Loyalty expressed the
Japanese's internal need to fit in. A second outward
expression was presented when the soldiers returned
home and attempted to find white-collar work that
would launch them into the middle-class, instead of
returning to their previous service-based jobs. The
Nisei's success in their occupational endeavors made
it seem like they had appropriately assimil ated and
America stopped talking about the Japanese presence.
However, not discussing the situation led to a complele silence about the Japanese post-war era.
Discourse about this silent period has begun only
recently, in large part because of the Sansei. These
third generation Japanese-Americans started examin-
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ing their parents' era and brought information about
the post-war period to light. Scholars had previously
discussed the anti-Asian sentiment in the United
States, as well as the roles that the Japanese played
during the War. However, anti-Asian thought as a
precursor to Japanese treatment in subsequent years
has never been closely examined. Investigation of
early anti-Asian sentiment through the post-war
period shows that the seamless integration of the
Japanese into American society was not as innocent as
usually presented. Understanding the lack of innocence in Japanese integration in no way disputes the
reality of that integration, but provides reasoning for
why it appeared faultless. The Japanese-Americans
actively smoothed over or ignored transitional difficulties . Ignoring those difficulties highlights the fact that
Japanese re-entry into white-America dealt with how
well Japanese-Americans functioned in society, not
that the American majority forgot their anti-Japanese
transgressions. Seamless entry originated in the
Japanese-Americans' willingness to conceal their
presence in America which created the subsequent
silence that the Sansei would eventually uncover.
A short history of the Japanese presence in America helps to underscore the Japanese reluctance to call
attention to themselves after the War.
Japanese
immigrants had a relatively short existence within
America. Despite that small time frame, in the eyes of
Californians, the Japanese had worn out their welcome. Bias against the Japanese primarily began as
an economically based problem as while Californians
believed that they were forced out of service-based jobs
due to the influx of Asian immigrants. America had
just recently passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which
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denied immigration of the Chinese into America for the
same economic reasons. Naturally, then, the increase
of the Japanese population escalated anti-Asian
sentiments. 3
Industry was not the only sector of society in which
the Japanese were excluded - they also felt the push
from San Francisco school districts. The people of San
Francisco unsuccessfully advocated a segregated
school system, mimicking the "separate but equal"
ideas in other parts of the country. 4 Anti-Asian
feelings ran so high that when politicians campaigned
for public office many of their platforms dealt with
getting rid of the Japanese problem in the United
States, with campaign slogans such as "Swat the
Jap."s
Racial tensions primarily took root on the West
Coast, where Japanese immigration was more prevalent. However, the West's feelings must not be mistaken as the sentiment for the rest of the country. In
fact, when California petitioned for a bill to eliminate
Japanese immigration, Theodore Roosevelt was quoted
as saying "Didn't you know such a thing was preposterous?" and later added "l would veto it if it were passed
unanimously." 6 The President's remarks show the
regional nature of Anti-Asian thought. Regionalism is
important to understand not only for the treatment of
3

Ibid., 605-608; Maisie Conrat, Executive Order 9066: The
Internment of 110,000 Japanese Ame ricans, (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press for the California Historical Society, 1972), 16.
4
Ibid., 19-20.
5
Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejtidice: The Anti-Japanese
Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion,
(New York: Atheneum, 1969), 97.
0
Buell, Political Science Quarte rly, 1922, 618 -619.
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the Japanese during the war, but especially after because where else would Nisei return but the West
where they had grown up?
The attack on Pearl Harbor seemed to confirm the
stereotype that the Japanese were "sneaky" and "unscrupulous."7 As a result, Pearl Harbor was the
catalyst of the infamous Executive Order 9066 that
instructed the Japanese to move out of the military
zones and into relocation centers. However, a grave
misconception surrounds the Order. While it did lead
to the evacuation of over 110,000 Japanese people, the
Executive Order itself never directly mentioned Japanese people. The Order instead gave the West Coast
the military power to do whatever they saw fit to
protect the war zone from enemy invasion. 8 Of course,
effectively the Order le t people on the West Coast make
a decision about a group of people who had a striking
resemblance to those who attacked Pearl Harbor, and
whom the West had looked down upon for decades.
Mounting racial tensions fell heavily on the Nisei.
White-Americans doubted the Nisei's loyalty not only
due to their physical attributes, but also because of
their ties to Japan. The lssei (first generation immigrants) customarily registered their children's birth in
Japan, even if the children were born in the United
States and were U.S. citizens by birth right. The
7

Jacobus tenBroek, et. aJ., Prejudice, War, and the
Constitution, (Berkeley : University of California press, 1954), 27,
315, 329.
8
Louise Fiset, "Redress For Nisei Public Employees in
Washington State after World War fl," Pacific Northwest
Quarterly 1996-1997 88 (1) : 23; "Executive Order 9066,"
Japanese American internet Curriculum, 14 October 2006
<http://bss.sfsu.edu/ internment/ executiorderYU66.html>.
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resulting dual citizenship led Americans to believe that
Nisei loyalty actually rested with Japan. 9 American
citizenship simply was not enough to dislodge the
growing fear of the Japanese, so the Executive Order
was not contested by the American majority, despite
its obvious implications.
The Japanese were also unable to do anything in
response to Executive Order 9066 or to assuage the
fears about their loyalty to the American population.
If Japanese people spoke out they would be seen as
disloyal to the United States; additionally, they physically could do nothing, since they lacked political
power. The Government denied the lssei citizenship
until 1952 and with it the right to vote. The majority
of Nisei children were usually too young. 10 The only
option for the Japanese was to prove their loyalty in
another way.
Creating an all-Japanese battalion caused some
reluctance since the Japanese were specifically not
drafted at the onset of the War, due to suspicion of
espionage and disloyalty. 11 When President Franklin
Roosevelt was asked about the 442 nd 's formation he

9
Umezawa Duus, Unlikely liberators, 46; Donna K. Nagata,
"The Japanese-American Internment: Perceptions of Moral
Community, Fairness, and Redress," in Journal of Social Issues,
46 (1990), 135.
0
'
Ibid.
11
"Army Opens Ranks to Japanese Units," New York Times.
29 January 1943 p. 9; The Pacific War and Peace: Americans of
Japanese Ancestry in Military Intelligence Service 1941-1952,
(San Francisco: Military Intelligence Service Association of
Northern California and the National Japanese American
Historical Society, 1991), 13; United Japanese Society of Hawaii,
A Hist01"Y of Japanese in Hawaii, (Honolulu: The Society, 1971),
268.
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said, "No loyal citizen of the United States should be
denied the democratic right lo exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry." 12
Roosevelt's commenls presented an overly idealized
version of the situalion for the Nisei soldiers. The
Nisei were not selected to fight as Americans, but as
more soldiers for the American cause. When the army
called for volunteers from the relocation centers a
great majority of the Nisei signed up to not only fight
for their country, bul to prove their loyalty to the
American people in a Lime and silualion when everyone believed the opposite. Opposition to lhe Japanese
prompted the 442 nd 's motto "Go for Broke." They fully
intended to risk everything because they believed lhat
anything less would prove to America that lhey were
not loyal. One Nisei soldier sums up his and other
men's situalion perfeclly: "We're fighting two wars.
One for American democracy, and one against the
prejudice toward us in America." 13 Thus it became
imperalive Lhat lhe Nisei fight lo redeem lheir family
and friends at home. The Nisei believed lhat if they
lost battles or jeopardized the war effort they would
also lose the trust thal had been put in lhem by their
fellow Japanese lo prove their uni led loyalty. 14
The army was ve1y aware of how the recruiting
process of the 442 nd looked lo lhe Japanese population-body replacemenls for lhe fallen members of the
Orville Cresap Shirey, Americans: The Story of lite 442 nd
Combat Team, (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946),
19.
13
Umezawa Duus, Urili/cely Liberators, 44
14
Conrad R. Stein, Nisei Re_qimenl, (Chicago: Childrens
Press, 1985), 17.
12

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

7

I
I
I

al Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 13 [2008

34

Historical Perspectives

March 2008

100 th Battalion (a Japanese unit from Hawaii). 15
Despite this, the army did not really mask the fact that
they had no idea where to place the Combat Team in
relation to other platoons. As a result, the 442 nd was
considered the "bastard battalion" that did not really
fit anywhere in the military. The army saw the battalion as a "guinea pig battalion" and "bullet shields" for
the real army. 16 These stigmas from within the army
only helped to fuel outside disregard for the Japanese
community.
The mentality of the army influenced the newspaper coverage of the 442 nd as newspapers depended on
what information the military released. The army's
reluctance to circulate news resulted from their fear
that the Nisei soldiers would be viewed as what they
were, "cannon fodder," due to the countless numbers
of Nisei soldiers killed on the battlefield. The army
instead tried to promote an image of the Nisei as
"willing martyrs" for the American cause in Europe.
Yet the army also wanted to downplay how large of a
role the 442 nd had in the war effort. When large battles
took place, and the U.S. military was able to gain
ground, white soldiers were the ones pictured in the
newspapers back home - not the 442 nd members from
the front lines. 17
The army could not place the 442 nd in a particular
platoon, wanted new recruits, but could not promote
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,s Umezawa Duus, Unlikely Liberators, 151.
16

lbid., 23-24, 152-153; Karleen Chinen, et. aJ., Japanese
Eyes ... American Heart, (Honolulu: Tenclai Educational
Foundation, 1998), 4.
17
Patricia Curtin. "Press Coverage of the 442 nd Regimental
Combat Team (Separate-Nisei): A Case Study in Agenda
Building," in American Journalism 12 (3, 1995), 231.
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the fact that the Japanese would be thrown in the
front lines, and also did not want 442 nd heroics pictured in the paper. The indecisiveness of the army to
ma.lee a firm stance on their position about the 442 nd ,
only reiterates how America did not know what to do
with the Japanese .
Despite the military's control of what was released
about the 442"\ East Coast papers lauded their
military successes. Since lhe 442 nd was doing so well
it was impossible to write negatively about them, so
West Coast (who still held a regional vehemence)
newspapers printed nothing at all. 18 The West Coast
went to outstanding lengths Lo downplay the success
stories of the 442 nd • They often ran side-by-side
stories of the 442 nd 's formation and the battles America
was fighting against the Japanese in the Pacific, to
detract from the 442"ct 's military achievements. 19 J\ll
press coverage - in whatever form it took - stopped
completely after the deactivation of the 442"ct .20 It was
not until recent Limes that public interest pushed the
facts about the relocation era and the concerned
parties back into the news.
ln turn, the way the newspaper coverage played
out, meant that on the West Coast people still refused
to acknowledge the 442 n d or were unaware of its
formation and what it accomplished. The lack of
communication led to problems for lhe Nisei when
they returned home as well as for their older lssei
parents, recently released from the relocation centers.
The discrepancies in n ewspaper reporting stopped lhe
18
19

20

Ibid., 23 0- 2 31.
Ibid., 2 2 6- 23 4.
!bit.I., 239 .
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blending process of ethnic Japanese culture and
American societal values.
The return of the Nisei soldiers cannot be viewed as
one cohesive transition, but instead should be differentiated based on their living situations on both the East
and West Coasts of America. An in-depth study of the
East Coast is unnecessary primarily because there
were only a small number of Japanese from that
region, but also because negative public sentiment
toward them during the War was negligible. 21 The
Japanese who trained for combat in the East and
South shared an easy relationship with the town
locals. Due to this relationship, the Japanese returning to the East Coast and surrounding areas had a
relatively simple transition back into white-society. 22
The same thing can not be said for West Coast settlers.
The Japanese who returned to California and other
Western states faced the same type of anti-Asian
sentiment that they knew from their pre-war experience; which means that one must break down the
discussion of Japanese West Coast settlers even
further.
Exclusion and disdain greeted the majority of the
Nisei soldiers who returned home on the West Coast.
Many of the soldiers could not rent apartments or
houses, were not allowed to patronize restaurants, and
the states that housed internment centers did not
want the Japanese to remain or return there. The
West's general ideology stated that it was up to the
21

Umezawa Duus, Unlikely Liberalors, 141.

22

Stein, Nisei Regiment, 22.
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Nisei to fix their own problems, social or economic. 23
In defending their positions against the Japanese, and
specifically the 442 n d , some Americans slated that the
442 nd soldiers fough t so well in the War because they
had enjoyed killing whites and that their true loyalty
belonged to the Japanese Emperor. 24 Public consciousness, which basically called the Japanese
"white-murderers," clearly showed the difference
between the lsseis and Niseis' status between the two
coastlines. The importance of the East and West
dichotomy, however, does not overshadow how those
anti-Japanese feelings significantly affected individual
Japanese people.
Regionalism only addresses the Japanese situation
on the surface. A deeper level of examining post-war
re-entrance into American society must be viewed in
two distinct ways: the external and the internal. The
external level deals with the outside pressure ofwhiteAmerica silently asking the Japanese not to remind
them of their inherent Japanese qualities. The internal level is then, the inward expression of how the
Japanese responded to those outside pressures and
molded themselves in a way that would best fit into the
American majority. As the Japanese were obviously
physically recognizable, visually blending into American society after the War was not an option. Instead,
they began a process of adopting American culture and
values. Japanese citizens sought out "clean work" to
23

Thelma Chang, I Call Never Forget: Men of lhe
100°'/442"d. (Honolulu, HI: Sigi Productions, 1991), 188;
Umezawa Duus, Unlikely Liberators, 146; J e re Taka hashi, NiseiSansei: Shifting Japanese A rn ericon. lde nlilies a1td Politics.
(Philade lphia: Templeton U. Pr., 1997), 114 and J 22.
24
Chang, J Can Never Forget, 190.
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I

aid their transition. They looked for white-collar jobs
or college educated positions to boost the Japanese
social status into a middle-class setting. Japanese
people were able to do this by virtue of the fact that,
unlike African Americans at this time, segregation laws
did not push them out of the education system. The
ability to enter higher-levels of schooling meant the
Japanese had a springboard to attain that middle class
notoriety. 25
The Japanese post-war transition seemed so
innocent as they easily slipped into the education
system- meaning of course, that no one thought there
were problems to discuss. In fact, the Japanese were
not aware that their experiences during the war,
whether it was through military service or the camps,
were something they could talk about. Now, of course,
there are multiple documentaries, stories, and lessons,
but no one talked about the situation of the Japanese
in the late 1940s. One Nisei girl recounts how her
father was in a separate camp than she and her family
and was unable to write to them, not because he
lacked permission, but because there was no way to
express the situation at hand. 2 c,
The inabilities for the Japanese to express themselves only worsened once the Nisei returned home or
were released from the relocation camps. They felt
unsure of their place within the larger American
context or even within their own communities. As a
result, the Japanese were compelled to "make do."
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Takahashi, Nisei/Sansei, 118,121,122.
Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese
Americans in Poslwar ATllericun Cu.llure,
1945 1900, (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 28.
26
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Such a compulsion u rged Lhe Nisei to submerge their
ethnic and racial iden tity under that of the American
culture. 27 The Nisei h a d learned through their experiences during the wa r th a t their Ame rican loyalty was
necessary for survival. ln turn, they embraced the
middle-class ideology a nd became as American as they
possibly could. 28 Th e fact that the Sansei did not
question their parents ' participation in World War 11 for
so long exemplifies Lhe effectiveness of Japanese
integration into middle-class America. 29
The story or Tokyo Rose (Lhe American G.l. term
created to describe any one of the female, Englishspeaking, Japanese propaganda radio broadcasters
during the War) provides a case in point of the exte rnal
pressures that the Japanese fa ced.
lva Toguri
D'Aquino was an American citizen who wa s taking care
of her aunt in Japan when Pearl Harbor was attacked,
and as a result was una ble to return home.
D'Aquino 's eventual deslitule status forced her into
broadcasting propaga nda for Japan and she was
therefore considered a traitor to her American citizenship. Once she returned home, the U.S. Government
denied D'Aquino 's citizen s hip rights and placed her in
prison. Everyone in America and Japan knew that
there was no singular Tokyo Rose a nd, even more so,
that D'Aquino was not guilty of treason .30
D'Aquino's situation is important because the Nisei
community did nothing to help her. The Nisei's refusal
to step in and lend support r eveals their reluctance to
27

I
I
I

Taka has hi , Nisei/Son.sei, 11 3 , 11 5, 15 5 .
Simpson, An Abse 1tl Presence, 33.
29
Taka h a shi, Nisei/ Sonsei, 156 .
"" Nakasone , The Nisei So ldie r, 13 0 .
28
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disturb their newly acquired Japanese American
identity. 3 1 The Nisei's lack of response to the D'Aquino
situation was not just individual; but also that of
associated groups. The JACL (Japanese American
Citizens League) also refused to confront the Tokyo
Rose case and isolated the community from the entire
issue. The JACL was afraid to shine any light back
onto Japanese Americans, good or bad. 32 In the minds
of the Nisei on the West Coast, it was time for them to
get out of the limelight, and their attempt to find a way
to blend into American life without controversy was in
the forefront of their minds.
As a result, blending became the process by which
the lssei and Nisei integrated into American society.
The integration was seen as innocent. Yet that "innocent" re-entry came at the price of self identity. A
complete submergence of Japanese culture and ethnic
identity had to occur before white middle-class America accepted them.
Since the Japanese's earliest arrival, American
society looked down upon their population and saw
them as nothing but a labor class who competed with
white Americans for positions in the service industry,
and eventually as spies whose true alliance belonged
to the Japanese Emperor. All of these ideologies
melded into one ethnic, Oriental stereotype. The
attack on Pearl Harbor confirmed the treachery and
sneakiness the greater population attributed to Asians,
and rumors about enemy spy rings flourished. The
West Coast's lingering refusal to accept the Japanese
as American citizens encapsulated fear of the Orient
31

32

Ibid. 139 and Simpson, An Absent Presence, 84.
Ibid., 101 and 103 .
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and caused the internment of the Japanese in ten
relocation centers in states with a West Coast bias.
Finally, when the Nisei were called upon to fight for
their country in a battle that was not only meant to
show American democracy but also prove their loyalty,
the 442 c.1 Regimental Combat Team was formed. The
442 nd soldiers fought with a vigor that belied their
country's lack of faith and trust in their capabilities.
The 442 nd proved lo the entire world what side of the
War in which they fought. However, the sporadic news
coverage in the East and the less than truthful coverage in the West did nothing to abate loyalty fears.
When the lsseis and Niseis returned home, (primarily
in the West) people were only marginally aware of what
the 442 nd accomplished, and most of that information
was skewed, causing the internalization and re-evaluation of what the Japanese had to outwardly perpetuate
in order to find acceptance with the American populace.
As it turned out, the Japanese were still the pariah
of the American continent. They had to hide half, if
not all, of who they were and immerse themselves in
while cult ure so as to no longer be called traitors.
These internal transformations caused them to ignore
D'Aquino's plight, all in the name of not drawing
unneeded attention to themselves. lt was not until a
generation later, when the Sansei began to question
this uncharacteristic hush period within American
society, that Japanese participation in the War resurfaced. Through this movement, the Sansei were able
to uncover not only their lost ethnic heritage but also
uncover the plighl lheir parents and grandparents
experienced during the height of the War and subsequent aftermath. The Sansei discovered one of Amer11
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ica's most controversial periods, due to not only the
politics involved, but also because of the silence that
it was drowned in. Once the racial lines were drawn,
it was difficult to erase, especially with the lack of
communication between all parties. The culmination
of over a century's worth of conflict led to the phenomenon in which the Japanese re-integration into middleclass America became one of re-evaluation and redefinition instead of the comp lete acceptance they had
fought for during the War.
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